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INTRODUCTION
This Special Issue contains several articles that use theoretical and
empirical findings about causation at low doses in an attempt to provide
useful methodological insights to those concerned with making choices
about the tolerable level of danger posed by carcinogens and toxic agents
at very low exposures. The reason for our concern with the soundness of
choices dealing with those exposures has been most vividly and tragically
shown by the two natural events — earthquake and resulting tsunami —
that caused the catastrophes that so greatly affect Japan. The nuclear
power plans suffered failures that have had an almost immediate impact
on the future of energy production and policies of countries that depend
or consider on nuclear energy. Once again, the development and safety
of nuclear power is questioned, in part because of the belief that very low
exposure to the radionuclides emitted in those accidents causes cancers,
regardless of dose. The question then is: Is there evidence—rather than
either dogma or assumption or both—that low levels of exposure cause
detriment to human health? Clearly, there is no argument that much larg-
er exposures do cause cancer or can kill in very short order.
In regulatory risk analysis, causation, through dose-response models, is
part of the legal basis for justifying the reduction of exposures to haz-
ardous agents likely to cause cancer. When a sufficiently large population
is exposed to a very low (near-background) dose, even nearly infinitesimal
excess individual risks can in principle cause a substantial number of addi-
tional cancer cases. In the aggregate, the overall expected number of can-
cer cases, while large, may still be generally undetectable, given the large
background number of cancers in a population. To set environmental and
occupational standards, the law couples legal causation and the “best sci-
ence” about cause and effect to regulatory policy-making. The potential
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for judicial review of an unsound regulatory choice—review that occurs on
both sides of the Atlantic—should limit the scope of an agency freedom to
act arbitrarily. Throughout the special issue, we see that this is not true in
practice. Hazardous exposures are regulated (e.g., via numerical standards
limiting exposure, often considering hourly or other temporal window) at
either acceptable or tolerable risks: for example, a one in a million chance
of cancer death yields the corresponding tolerable exposure, for a given
causal model of dose-response (Holland, 1986). The usual or default
model used in setting those allowable exposures, for cancer risk assess-
ment, is (regardless of its overall form) linear, no threshold (or beneficial
effects), the LNT. Unfortunately, this is a conjectural model, as for any real
carcinogen there must be some minimum level at which a response can be
detected. Defaulting to the LNT—when incorrect—can do more harm
than good. For toxic agents, the threshold model is generally used (often
with factors of safety to further decrease the magnitude of the dose to an
acceptable level of intake by humans. Because the threshold model cannot
account for any beneficial effects at very low doses, it can also lead to sub-
optimal decisions.
The purpose of this Special Issue is to address several policy-science
implications of default dose-response models, their biphasic (hormetic)
alternatives, and the consequences of using these defaults (LNT and
threshold models) when the evidence is contrary to those defaults.
Rather than reducing the burden of disease, they can actually add to it.
Rather than preventing cancer, defaults actually add to the burden of dis-
ease by preventing any beneficial effect and thus increase to the overall
social costs associated with a policy that disallows, de facto or de jure, a
biphasic alternative—even when that alternative is demonstrably correct. To
achieve our objective, the special issue deals with:
• Aspects of dose-response use in US regulatory law
• Aspects of dose-response use in the EU countries
• Overview of Chinese uses of risk assessment and management based on
cancer and toxicological end-points
• Linear and non linear dose-response models with an emphasis on ion-
izing radiations at low doses (or dose rates)
• Aspects of costs and benefits analysis associated with the choice of dose-
response models
The Special Issue also suggests ways to deal with policy postulates,
such as the precautionary principle, that generally stand for the proposi-
tion that “when there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to the environ-
ment, scientific uncertainty should not prevent prudent actions to prevent poten-
tially large or irreversible damage, as well as the critical issue of linearity at low
doses” (Cameron, 1994). A threat, of course, may just be the result of igno-
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rance or an incorrect perception. The combination of precautionary
stance and use of a hypothesis that cannot be tested creates complex pol-
icy issue that can have large and unintended societal effects. The foun-
dational basis for precautionary principle (O’Riordan and Jordan, 1995)
in many conventions and treaties, as well as pronunciations by a number
of entities, requires differentiating them between legally binding forms
(e.g., Title XVI, Art. 130r of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union
(1992); the Delaney Clause to the US FFDCA). Precautionary principles
tend to place the burden of proof about who causes the hazardous situa-
tion leading to risk on those who market or develop a product, as the EU
does in the REACH Directive. An example of such a shift (Commission of
the European Communities, 2001) is that the
“[r]responsibility to generate knowledge about chemicals should be
placed on industry. Industry should also ensure that only chemicals
that are safe for the intended purposes are produced.”
The theoretical possibility that biphasic models can be used in regu-
lating exposures, nonetheless, can be traced to EC’s Commentary, which
also states that:
“A scientific evaluation of the potential adverse effects should be
undertaken based on the available data ... [T]his requires reliable sci-
entific data and logical reasoning, leading to a conclusion which
expresses the possibility of occurrence and the severity of a hazard’s
impact on the environment, or health of a given population ... “
(Commission of the European Communities, 2001).
More specifically, this Commentary concludes that precautionary meas-
ures must not be applied to address conjectured risks. As some of the papers in
this Special Issue indicate, it is not clear that the difference between con-
jectured risk – a result of using a LNT model – and actual risks is explic-
itly recognized either in the EU or in the US. To the extent that other
countries, e.g., China, follow US or European regulatory risk assessment
frameworks, the overall result is less that societally optimal. The Canadian
government proposed guiding principle for risk analysis includes the pre-
cautionary principle (Government of Canada, 2001, The Need for a Federal
Approach) as follows:
A. Follow-up scientific activities, including further research and scien-
tific monitoring, are a key part of the application of the precautionary
approach. ... (a)
B. “Sufficiently sound information base” should be interpreted as sound
and reasonable scientific information, including uncertainties that,
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through evaluation ... [T]hat is, while scientific information would
not need to demonstrate definitively the cause-and-effect relation-
ship between risk and serious harm, it would demonstrate that such
a risk exists. (And)
C. Generally, the responsibility for providing the scientific information
base (the burden of proof) should rest with the party who is taking an
action associated with potential or serious harm. ... “
An important issue that often goes unstated is well captured by
Canadian Government (Gov of Canada, 2001). Specifically, it states that:
“... it is impossible to prove a negative (e.g., to prove categorically that
something will cause no harm, or to prove with absolute certainty that
something bad might not happen or to prove that something is not
harmful), but possible to demonstrate that “reasonable testing” was
done with no evidence of harm ... The real and potential impacts of
making a precautionary decision (whether to act or not to act),
including social, economic and other relevant factors, should be
assessed.”
US law contains several variants of precaution to justify the regulation
of toxic agents. For example:
• “The Administrator shall, specify, to the extent practicable: 1) Each
population addressed by any estimate of public health effects; 2) The
expected risk or central estimate of risk for the specific populations; 3)
Each appropriate upper-bound or lower-bound estimate of risk ...” (Safe
Drinking Water Act, § 300g-1(b)(3)),
• “Provide an ample margin of safety to protect public health or to pre-
vent an adverse environmental effect” (Clean Air Act, §112(f)).
• “To assure chemical substances and mixtures do not present an unrea-
sonable risk of injury to health or the environment” (Toxic Substances
Control Act, TSCA §2(b)(3)).
• “Adequate to protect public health and the environment from any rea-
sonably anticipated adverse effects” (Clean Water Act, CWA
§405(d)(2)(D)).”
It would seem that, if an agent were provably beneficial, such finding
would not trigger its regulation under any of these statutes, until an unac-
ceptably unsafe dose is reached. We think that this precept applies to the
EU’s as well, which uses the concept of zero tolerance. Specifically, the reg-
ulatory aspects of exposure to toxic agents (a combination of Regulations
and Directives issued by the EU) based on the principle of zero tolerance
means that no concentration is safe for human use or consumption, if a
P. F. Ricci and I. R. Sammis
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substance has not been issued a maximum residue limit (MRL). The
MRL is a requisite (Directive 2001/82/EC, the “cascade provisions”, from
Commission of the European Communities, 2001) for the marketing of
any veterinary products used as sources of food for humans: if there is no
MRL, then the product containing certain listed substance for which
there is no MRL is cannot be marketed unless there is zero mass quanti-
ty of pharmacologically active of the listed substances. Thus, for those
substances, unless the MRL exists, exposure to them is not tolerable. But,
as the limits of analytical detection are increasing (lower and lower con-
centrations are increasingly detected), zero tolerance is equivalent and
seemingly much more stringent that the zero risk of US law (used in the
Delaney Amendments to the FFDCA, PL86-618; 21 U.S.C
§376(b)(5)(B)).
UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES AND CHOICES
Uncertainty and causation are inevitable aspects of public heath deci-
sions based on causal models and thus the correct assessment of risky out-
comes must also include the uncertainty in those outcomes. Yet, some
interpretations of the precautionary principle – such as political will in the
EU — either dismiss or ignore this tenet in favor of actions that are guid-
ed by qualitative, deterministic (but often not testable) assumptions.
Avoiding costly mistakes, even when made in good faith, suggests achiev-
ing a convergence between legal principles and their practical application
in a socially efficient way (Wynne, 1992; Wynne and Mayer, 1993). Some
of the aspects decision-making that are relevant to this point and to the
issues and methods discussed in this Special Issue include considering:
• Initiating Events and Outcomes for which there is no past experience thus
requiring great attention to the measures of uncertainty used and the
way choices are made
• Deterministic representations where formal description of biological can-
cer processes (e.g., via a system of ordinary or partial differential equa-
tions) gives the illusion of complete and certain knowledge of future
outcomes and their magnitude (given initial and boundary conditions)
• Sensitivity to initial and boundary conditions for certain types of models
used to describe a causal biological process
• Need for sensitivity analysis, when scenarios describe seemingly plausible
case-and-effect relationships
• Misspecified models that exclude important factors, and wrongly or
incompletely formulate the causal relations between those factors and
response
• Statistical uncertainties that combine estimation and inference with the
variability of data (e.g., sampling variability), heterogeneities, con-
founders, measurement errors, and missing data
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Probabilistic reasoning provides a formal and coherent method (not
accepting a gamble that surely leads to loss and that, on average, more is
preferred to less) for describing uncertain knowledge and for updating it
with new data, while accounting for variability. Probability distributions,
in contrast to deterministic numbers, indicate the variability in quantities
that may be essential for stating and evaluating data-driven causal argu-
ments (Shafer, 1996; Pearl, 2000).
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